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INTRODUCTION
The types of costing information utilized by the General
Mining Association (GMA) in the Nova Scotian coal industry
during the 19th century are detailed in this paper. As an absentee owner situated in London, the GMA required a flow of accounting information in order to manage its substantial properties, particularly the Sydney Colliery on Cape Breton Island,
Nova Scotia.1 Comparisons were made to findings, both published and unpublished, which the authors have advanced from
earlier archival research into north-east coal mining during the
industrial revolution in Britain [Fleischman and Parker, 1997;
Fleischman and Macve, 2001; Oldroyd, 1996, 1999]. The GMA
archive was examined with reference to the additional question
of whether or not costing methods were exported across the
Atlantic because of the imperial connection resulting from
Canada’s position within the British Empire.
A DEVELOPING LITERATURE
Our study of the transfer of accounting techniques within
an empire is explored through the example of the coal industry.
From the British perspective, there is a rapidly emerging literature on coal-mining accounting during the 19th century. Studies focused on the first half-century during which the industrial
revolution in Britain was running its course include Edwards et
al. [1995], Edwards and Newell [1994], Fleischman and Macve
[2001], Fleischman and Parker [1997], McLean [1997], and
Wale [1989a]. Works by Boyns [1993], Boyns and Edwards
[1997], Boyns and Wale [1996], Edwards et al. [1995], and Wale
[1989a, b] have commenced the process by which the second
half-century is now under the scrutiny of accounting historians.
These investigations complement earlier work by economic historians, including Bulman and Redmagne [1951], Church
[1986], Flinn [1984], Harris [1976], Hirsch and Hausman
[1983], Mendlicott [1981], Rowe [1923], and Walters [1975].
The above-mentioned works run the gamut from limited
investigations of individual coal-mining enterprises, to regional
studies of various U.K. locales, to national surveys. For the pur1
All Canadian collieries mentioned are located in Nova Scotia. Sydney,
Low Point Barrasois, Bridgeport, Lingan, Cornhill, Point Aconi, Spanish River,
and Victoria are all situated on Cape Breton Island. Albion in the Pictou
Coalfield and Joggins and Springhill in the Cumberland Coalfield are on the
Nova Scotian peninsula.
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poses of the comparison to Nova Scotian mining undertaken
here, the authors propose to concentrate on Tyneside2 operations, in the Great North Coalfield centered on Newcastle. Costing at the collieries of the Great North coal measures stood at
the forefront of practice in Britain. Access to London via the
sea made Northumberland, Durham, and Newcastle the largest
and best-developed coalfield in Britain from the 17th century
[Ashton and Sykes, 1964, p. 194; McCord, 1979, p. 36]. According to Flinn and Stoker [1984, p. 18], the north-east’s collieries
enjoyed a high reputation for technical progress and business
organization, techniques that mine owners elsewhere copied.
Potentially the greatest contribution of the region to the historical development of costing practice was in the dissemination of
knowledge by Tyneside viewers (mining engineers/managers).
Among the tasks they performed was the provision of cost data
for forecasting the profitability of mine workings and for evaluating the relative advantages of capital improvement projects. A
body of costing practice was already well developed on
Tyneside by the 1730s [Oldroyd, 1996]. As the 18th and 19th
centuries progressed, the notability and expertise of particular
viewers caused them to be surrounded by schools of apprentices, who in turn moved out from Tyneside to other regions,
countries, and related industries, such as iron and lead [Flinn
and Stoker, 1984, pp. 57-59; Hiskey, 1979, pp. 8-9]. Tyneside
viewers were, for example, employed on the Duke of Norfolk’s
estates in South Yorkshire [Medlicott, 1981, pp. 183-188]. They
also prepared costings for the Bowes family’s lead-smelting
operations in County Durham [Oldroyd, 1999, p. 191].
Recent studies of Tyneside accounting techniques include
those of McLean [1997], who examined the costing records of
the Tanfield Moor Colliery in County Durham, 1800-1850, and
Oldroyd [1996, 1999], who looked at the earlier records of the
aristocratic coal cartel in the north-east known as the “Grand
Allies.” Both authors found evidence of sophisticated costing
practice, which directly assisted management in a range of
activities, including decision making. Fleischman and Parker’s
[1997, p. 115] subsequent research revealed a level of sophistication in north-east colliery costings during the industrial

2
One reviewer has noted that “Tyneside” as used in this paper is not geographically accurate since County Durham does not front the River Tyne.
However, we have maintained the term to be consistent with the labeling in
Fleischman and Parker [1997] and Fleischman and Macve [2001].
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revolution that transcended what they had found in other British industries, such as textiles and iron.
Given the volume of research on British coal mining in the
second half of the 19th century, the issue might be raised that
these materials would afford a better contrast to Nova Scotian
developments because of a greater chronological correspondence, notwithstanding the overlap between the formative
period prior to 1850 and previous research on Tyneside. However, there are numerous reasons why somewhat earlier
Tyneside methods are more directly pertinent even apart from
the obvious perspective that the authors’ expertise in this region
is derived from primary source material. As Fleischman and
Parker [1997, ch. 5] and Fleischman and Macve [2001] have
endeavored to demonstrate, mining techniques in North-East
England were quite different from other U.K. venues. These
differences, not to be restated here in great detail, include the
use of the “bord and pillar” method of mining as distinct from
the “longwall,” the utilization of direct hire rather than the
“butty system” (subcontracting) for labor recruitment, and the
managerialism of the “viewers” to a much greater extent than
elsewhere. These inheritances were reflected in Nova Scotian
mining operations as the following pages will attempt to detail.
Aside from these aspects of the industry’s basic structure, there
were a number of other similarities between north-eastern and
Nova Scotian coal mining. As Brown [1871, p. 82] pointed out,
the coal mined in Nova Scotia was closer to the Tyneside product in terms of combustibility, carbon content, and ash residue.
Mining depths were great at both venues, at least post-1854 in
the case of Sydney, mandating large capital expenditure. Coal
mining in the Newcastle vicinity and Nova Scotia was not
linked to a native iron industry as elsewhere in the U.K., giving
rise to the expectation that greater attention would be paid to
distribution networks, particularly overseas transport.3 In both
North-East England and Nova Scotia, the industry was impacted by external control mechanisms — in Canada it was
governmental control, while on Tyneside it was the coal-owners’ cartel.
Work by Boyns et al. [1997a, b] has not only featured comparative archival research for the U.K. and France, but has also
3
Trevor Boyns has pointed out to us that post-1860, the South Wales coal
industry’s growth depended more upon expanded export than the local iron
industry. Hence, subsequent to that date, owners might have been expected to
pay greater attention to distribution networks.
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urged that accounting and business historians follow the lead.
Variously they have suggested that “the need for such work
[comparative accounting history] is receiving increased recognition,” that comparative history is a “valid methodological
tool,” and that accounting historians should begin to think beyond the box of their own native methodologies [Boyns et al.,
1997b, pp. 7, 8, 13]. It is within this framework that the following study is undertaken, but with the additional parameter that
the imperial connection aided and abetted the spread of accounting. We are also following the lead of Boyns et al. [1997a,
b] in focusing on what they defined as “industrial” accounting.
Our emphasis here is more specifically directed toward costing,
although we do touch upon the financial reporting necessitated
by the GMA’s absentee ownership of its Nova Scotian mining
operations.
There has been a wealth of recent literature on the export
of British accounting structures to former colonies [Annisette,
1999; Briston and Kedslie, 1997; Carnegie and Parker, 1999;
Chua and Poullaos, 1998; Parker, 1994]. However, the emphasis
of this research has been limited to the transfer of accounting
professionalization. Within the context of the 20th century,
Briston and Kedslie [1997, p. 194] wondered the degree to
which the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants
attempted to export “its training, educational and examining
processes.” Pre-20th century accounting links between metropolis and periphery are featured in work by Carnegie [1997],
Neu [1999], and Spraakman [1999], but this literature does
not deal with the export of industrial accounting methods.
Even though Canada was identified by Parker [1994, p. 609]
as an “active importer” of accounting exports from the U.K.,
we have not seen any research that focuses on costing issues.
Vent and Milne [1997] have done a comparative study of
precious metals mining, but since the mines were American
and Australian, the impact of an imperial connection would
not have been present. This paper proposes to begin an examination of these linkages.
Two main archives were visited. The Public Archives of
Nova Scotia (PANS) in Halifax houses mineral and mining
records, 1800-1868, as well as the Richard Brown collection.
The Beaton Institute (BI) at the University College of Cape
Breton in Sydney contains the records of the GMA, 1827-1901.
Additionally, comparative data were obtained from the Carlisle
Record Office (CRO), housing the estate records of the
Lowthers of Whitehaven, and the Northumberland Record
Published by eGrove, 2001
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Office (NRO), which contains the records of the North of
England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineers.
Narrating the story of the Sydney Mines is greatly facilitated by the longevity of key personnel, both in Nova Scotia and
the GMA in London. The Richard Browns, father and son,
served in an unbroken tenure of some 70-odd years as managers of the mines. Similarly, J.B. Foord and C.E. Swann served
for most of the century as Secretaries to the GMA proprietors.
The paper proceeds with a brief historical overview of the
history of the GMA’s coal-mining operations in Nova Scotia,
followed by an extensive analysis of the surviving accounting
records. Featured here are sections on expense control, capital
estimations, regulation, and accounting for labor. The paper
concludes with an assessment of the perceived linkages between Nova Scotian and Tyneside coal-mining practice.
THE GMA IN NOVA SCOTIA: AN OVERVIEW, 1826-1901
The systematic exploitation of coal in Nova Scotia began
with the formation of the GMA in 1826. Coal had been mined in
the province since at least 1715, but the early proprietors had
insufficient capital to engage in large-scale operations [Brown,
1871, pp. 100-101; Martell, 1945]. The GMA was formed by the
jewelry firm, Rundell, Bridge & Co., which acquired a 60-year
monopoly over all of the province’s mineral rights in commutation of the debts of Prince Frederick, Duke of York. The monopoly only lasted 30 years as the GMA agreed to its revocation
on December 31, 1857 in return for a new lease of its existing
holdings on preferential terms. The company also reserved the
right to expand into designated new sites [Brown, 1871, pp.
100-110; McKay, 1983, p. 20; Wylie, 1997, p. 15].
The Earl of Lowther must have had connections with the
company as it was at his behest that one of his stewards, Richard Brown, was sent to examine and report on the coal mines
in Cape Breton Island. Brown had trained as a viewer in the
Earl’s coal mines in Westmorland, England, a county heavily
influenced by Newcastle practice. In Canada he became manager of the Sydney Mines and chief engineer of the whole operation. As the paper will relate, Newcastle viewers did
consultancy work for the Lowther estates and were well known
to Brown. It is probably through these connections, plus the
fact that the north-east was internationally renowned for its
mining expertise, that the London-based company also employed them in Canada. The GMA’s lack of previous mining
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/3
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experience is probably significant; there would be an incentive
to hire the best people for this enterprise, taking into account
the scale of the investment.
In his later book, Brown [1871, p. 91] noted that the chief
objective of the GMA was to establish an extensive trade with
the U.S. In 1827, 20% of the coal consumed in Boston and New
York came from Great Britain, 34% from Pennsylvania, and
46% from Virginia [Brown, 1871, p. 93]. The GMA was unsuccessful in its attempts to penetrate this market, partly due to
the opening of the Schuylkill Canal in 1825, which provided
Pennsylvanian coal with an outlet to the sea. The company was
also impeded by U.S. trade tariffs that were only temporarily
relaxed between 1854-1866 [Forsey, 1926, p. 5; Macnutt, 1965,
p. 215]. Most of the GMA’s expansion was fed by increased
demand from the Canadian provinces. Coal production under
the GMA expanded from about 20,000 tons per year in 1825 to
about 100,000 tons in the 1850s. The period following the
rescission of the GMA’s monopoly saw the largest increase,
with production in Nova Scotia rising from about 600,000 tons
in 1867 to 8 million tons in 1913. New entrepreneurs were
attracted into the market, with most of the investment coming
from Britain, the U.S., and Montreal, resulting in a decline of
the relative position of the GMA [McKay, 1983, p. 13; Wylie,
1997, pp. 15-16]. The GMA sold its interests in Pictou to the
Halifax Coal Company in 1872 and the Sydney Mines to the
Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company in 1901. The Sydney
Mines in Cape Breton and the Albion Mines in Pictou were the
GMA’s major holdings, but there were also secondary workings
at Bridgeport, Lingan, Joggins, and elsewhere [McKay, 1983, p.
18]. Despite the large number of operations, Sydney was the
flagship installation and the focal point of most surviving
accounting records. It is to this archival material that we now
turn.
THE COMPARATIVE ACCOUNTING RECORD
In this section, the accounting practices of the GMA will be
considered across four parameters: expense control, capital
estimations, regulation, and accounting for labor. Comparisons
will be made to corresponding techniques found in northeastern coal mines during the industrial revolution.
Expense Control: From the outset, the Directors of the GMA
were interested in economy. In a report to the GMA’s Directors
Published by eGrove, 2001
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in 1834, John Buddle, the foremost Tyneside viewer, emphasized the need for economy [NRO: 3410/BUD/19/270]. When
Brown, Jr. was appointed to succeed his father in March 1864,
Foord, on behalf of the GMA, emphasized this responsibility:
. . . hence it becomes of the utmost importance that the
cost of raising and shipping it [coal] should be reduced
as low as possible. Your recent visit to the Collieries of
the North of England, and the practical information
you have doubtless acquired in those Collieries where
economy is studied as closely as possible, will enable
you to apply that information with advantage in your
future management of the Sydney Mines, so far as it
might be susceptible of solid and useful improvement
[PANS: MG1/158/37].
In 1880, when Brown’s managerial duties were extended to the
Low Point Barrasois and Lingan Mining Company, he agreed to
the following covenant:
Brown shall and will at all times observe the strictest
economy in all expenses he may incur on account of
the said company and keep or cause to be kept just and
true accounts of all his receipts, payments, transactions, and dealings on account of the said Company
[PANS: MG1/158/35-36].
While these contractual statements have the ring of boilerplate
verbiage, the Browns apparently believed that expense control
was an utmost responsibility. In 1870, Brown, Sr. wrote to his
son, congratulating him for reducing costs at Sydney and opining that “. . . the cost of working is the grand test of the competence of the manager and will speak for him in the strongest
language” [PANS: MG1/151/109].
The desire to reduce costs was reflected in the costing procedures adopted. Expenses were analyzed monthly and yearly
and subjected to ex post rationalization. The system went beyond the tracking of expenditure and constituted a genuine system of cost control, the basis of which was the calculation of
unit cost. R.H. Bridge, who is described in one of the documents as “accountant,” forwarded a retrospective estimate of
the cost per ton at the Sydney Mines for March 1870 to Foord.
In the letter, he referred to similar reports for January and
February, indicating regular monthly returns. Bridge also sent
Foord an annual return of the cost per ton at the Sydney Mines
for 1869 [BI: MG1419/83-110-1870/D8c]. Another annual return
has survived for the Albion Mines in 1841. Here, the annual
expenditure was analyzed and grouped under subheadings of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/3
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raising charges, shipping charges, new works, and royalties.
The various shipping charges were divided by the numbers of
chaldrons shipped, whereas the other charges were divided by
the number of chaldrons raised, the sum producing a grand
total. The chaldron was a traditional output measure based on
the volume of a coal wagon. This particular report was designated number 15, indicating that it was part of a sequence
[PANS: RG1/463/46].
A complete set of monthly cost returns has survived for the
Albion Mines for June 1868 in the papers of Thomas E. Forster,
the Newcastle viewer [NRO: 3410/FOR/3/2/131]. As well as including inventories of plant and analyses of employees and
rates of pay, these returns provided a detailed analysis of the
monthly expenditure converted into unit cost. The average cost
per ton for each expense was listed beside the average cost per
ton for the year to date and the average cost per ton to the same
point in the previous year. The report also included a summary
of the cost per ton of the various expenses for each of the five
previous years. Correspondence in August 1868 between
Brown, Jr. and Foord indicates that by this time the company
was using pro-forma cost sheets designed by Forster. Brown
complained that Forster’s monthly cost-per-ton sheets were
more detailed than those which the company had used previously [NRO: 3410/FOR/3/2/140]. The fact that this letter was
also found among Forster’s papers shows that Foord must have
sent it to Forster for his comments.
The 1870s saw an upsurge in costing activity at Sydney.
Comparative costings per ton for the Sydney and Lingan Mines
for 1872 were carried to tenths of a cent [PANS: MG1/159/52].
Perhaps the surviving record most reflective of sophisticated
costing is an 1874 document of Brown, Jr. in which he calculated the price of sales necessitated at various production levels.
First, Brown reckoned that the “fixed charges” for a relevant
range from 75,000 to 150,000 tons amounted to $62,972. He
then calculated the unit cost per ton at different levels to which
he added a variable cost component of $0.97. To generate the
profit required, Brown established a per-ton price ranging from
$2.75 at the 75,000 tons volume level to $2.00 at 150,000 tons.
He then performed a sensitivity analysis on the impact of a
$0.50 price advance per ton [PANS: MG1/159/75].
Correspondingly, the calculation of unit cost in the Tyneside coal industry had a long ancestry. In a letter to the Duke of
Northumberland in 1617, Hugh Bird computed the unit cost of
working and leading (overground haulage) Newburn Colliery
Published by eGrove, 2001
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[Hatcher, 1993, p. 265]. By 1730, unit cost calculations were
common practice in the region [Oldroyd, 1996]. There are
strong indications that the types of calculation which had been
devised on Tyneside in the 17th and 18th centuries were still
being practiced in the British coal industry in the nationalization era following World War Two. They certainly featured in
government statistics showing the unit cost, unit selling price,
and unit profit for the industry as a whole and in the pro-forma
costing forms used by individual collieries in the 1940s and
1950s. They were remarkably similar in design to the ones devised by Forster for the GMA some 80 years previously [Bulman
and Redmayne, 1951, pp. xxiii-xxiv, 116, 121; Clement, 1951,
pp. 38-41].
The pattern of survival of costing documents in Nova
Scotia is sporadic, with high points occurring in the 1840s,
1870s, and 1890s. Whether this pattern reflects the creation of
records or is merely a function of the vagaries of record survival
is difficult to tell. In some cases the peaks do correspond to
initiatives taken by particular officials.
In 1842, one George Wightman was sent to investigate the
GMA mining operations and to write a report on why the
Albion Mines were suffering losses [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 3,
folder of materials 1841-1856]. Wightman concluded that losses
on land speculation (£7000), dead stocks of materials and stores
(£1750), unnecessary expenditures on the works (£43,470 —
mostly a vastly overpriced railroad and superfluous housing),
an annual loss occasioned by the faulty arrangement of the coal
yard (£1000), and excessive labor costs (50% more than necessary) were to blame.
The second great wave of costing activity came in the
1870s, occasioned by the appointment of Jonathan Rutherford
as General Manager of the GMA holdings in 1872 and the
Swann visitations at the end of the decade. At this time there
appears in the archive a detailed record of expenditures on a
new winning at Sydney with columns for costs incurred
through to the end of 1872 and 1873 respectively [PANS: MG1/
159/62]. As was the case in the Newcastle region, managers
were concerned about the relative efficiency of horses and machinery [Fleischman and Macve, 2001]. In 1869, James Hudson,
a resident viewer trained in the U.K., complained to Cunard
and Morrow, the GMA’s Halifax agents, that at the Joggins
Mine the number of horses to tons raised (13 horses for 8,0008,500 tons annually) was proving too costly [PANS: RG21/A/Vol.
3]. The GMA’s proprietors were informed in the report for 1877
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/3
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that a reduction in the number of horses and associated human
handlers in favor of underground hauling machinery saved approximately £35-£40 per horse annually [BI: MG1419/91-682690/G/9]. Notwithstanding this concern, Brown, Sr. noted to
Jr. in March 1877 that greater attention should be paid to cost
on a monthly basis, citing as evidence the gross fluctuation in
annual horse upkeep charges ($74 in 1871, $106 in 1872)
[PANS: MG1/151/282].
Swann’s tenure as GMA Secretary had a positive impact on
the volume of expense control reports. In 1878, the year of
Swann’s first visit to Nova Scotia, E.W. Scovell, Chair of the
Board of Directors, reported how production costs had declined
as a result of working a new winning rather than the Queen Pit
and the considerable reductions in other expense categories the
Directors had enforced at the mines [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/H,
1878]. In the same year, it was further reported that Swann had
affected many economies and that he should return to Nova
Scotia frequently [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G/9, 1878]. A report
for 1880 chronicled another visit in which Swann reportedly
went over every item of expenditure with Brown, Jr. [G/11,
1880].
Although the annual reports to the GMA became extremely
sketchy in the 1890s, the last decade of ownership, and rarely
transcended barebones financial statements, certain of the expense control documents reflected a growing maturity. In 1896,
Swann was provided with an estimate for a new winning with
calculations of the expenses associated with 11⁄2 years of proving the coal seam and three years production at 100 tons and
upward per day. There were 33 expense categories [PANS:
MG1/159/98]. There was also an 1894 cost comparison of filling
orders in summer and winter. From July - September, when
raising costs alone impacted upon the cost of production, the
cost was 70.111¢ per ton. In winter (February-April), when
banking was an additional factor, the cost was 72.049¢. The
improvement in expense control at Sydney over time is seen
rather dramatically in a comparison of an 1860 and an 1897
abstract of production costs presented as Exhibits 1 and 2. The
differences in detail and the number of data categories are immediately apparent.4
4
Boyns [1993, pp. 336-337] demonstrated how the cost sheets at the Powell
Duffryn Colliery in South Wales reflected a more detailed breakdown of costs
in the period 1871-1913. New categories of cost were related to technological
innovations.
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EXHIBIT 1
Abstract of Production Costs, Sydney Mines, 1860
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EXHIBIT 2
Abstract of Production Costs, Sydney Mines, 1895
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The simple act of increasing the number of cost categories
does not in and of itself guarantee that managers utilized the
expanded data for more effective cost control. Typically archives do not contain the evidence to provide such assurances.
In this case, however, the detailed nature of the GMA’s cost
records, together with the inclusion of comparative data for
previous periods, indicates that the costs incurred were subjected to ex post rationalization, which is confirmed in the surviving correspondence and comparisons of actual to budget. A
letter in February 1869 from Forster to Foord began:
I have gone carefully through the various cost sheets of
the Mines belonging to the General Mining Association, which you forwarded to me, and as far as I am
able to judge from a consideration of the figures given,
I think the increase in the working charges has arisen
from the following causes: [NRO: 3410/FOR/3/2/140].
He then proceeded to discuss the major items, with suggestions
about how they might be reduced. A statement for the Albion
Mines in June 1842 computed the cost saving that would have
arisen in the month had the work force been paid at the same
rates as at Sydney. The situation was reviewed again in February 1843 when the actual labor cost saving was calculated at
£431, which over 12 months was expected to reduce the cost of
coal by nearly 2s a chaldron. The document also analyzed the
“proposed reductions not carried out,” totaling £38.8s.7d, and
found additional cuts of £78.4s.6d over and above the ones proposed by Brown, Sr. This analysis is the most detailed we have
seen in the GMA archive in terms of both the number of cost
reductions undertaken and the narrative provided to explain
and justify the cuts [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 7, folder of materials
1842-1866].
In summation, there seems ample evidence of managerial
attempts to control expenses. It appears that the Board of
Directors in London were willing to be proactive in overseeing
this phase of operations. One or two surviving letters indicate
that the London-based Directors felt at a disadvantage because
of the distances involved [see, for example, Foord’s letter to
Brown, Sr. of November 1849, BI: MG1419/82-42-1512/D9e].
The culmination came in 1878 with the first of Secretary
Swann’s “secret visits” that, for a while at least, became annual
events. The Browns looked upon intrusion by the Directors as
an irritant. In 1870, Brown, Sr. wrote to his son advising him to
keep his responses to the Directors’ requests for information
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/3
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simple as he doubted their ability to comprehend details. He
also urged his son to communicate expenses in pounds sterling
as they would appear less than if stated in dollars [PANS: MG1/
151/106]. In another letter of November 1877, perhaps in response to Brown, Jr.’s complaints about the intrusion of
Swann into mine affairs, Brown, Sr. pointed out that Foord, as
GMA Secretary, had been his cross to bear, and complained
that the Secretaries attempted to justify their positions by investigating trifling matters of expense (“ascertainments”)
[PANS: G1/151/300].
Capital Estimates: While the 1870s saw a heightened attention
to expense control of daily operations, what was not evident
were accounting records relating to Sydney’s obvious competitive shortcoming: the absence of an adequate distribution
network. The Sydney operation did not have a fleet of coal
carriers, as did some of its competitors. The 1871 annual report
to the proprietors identified the “shipping problem,” that the
buyers had to supply their own vessels while other mining enterprises were delivering coal [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G/2].
The 1873 report urged the construction of a new wharf to
accommodate steamers [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G/4]. In
Rutherford’s first report as General Manager in Nova Scotia,
he averred that he had not yet had time to bring his attention
to bear on production costs as he was dealing with distribution problems [BI: MG1419/91-68-2680/H, 1872]. In light of
this documented, high-priority difficulty, one might expect to
see in the archive estimates for dredging, wharf improvement,
ship procurement and alternative transport. There is virtually
nothing of this genre, giving rise to our thought that capital
improvements were not a focus of the accounting system.
The archive was not totally devoid of capital project estimates, however. One of the best examples was prepared in
March 1834 by D. Hoard, a Newcastle viewer. Hoard was one of
Buddle’s associates, and his computation was appended to a
report by Buddle on the construction of a new railway at
Sydney. The point at issue was whether to ship coal from the
existing quay at North Sydney or a new one at Bar Harbor.
Hoard costed the Bar Harbor link and calculated the relative
cost saving of the shorter route [NRO: 3410/BUD/19/227].
Homegrown examples of a similar genre include a technology
proposal (unauthored, but probably by Brown, Jr.) in 1882, in
which it was pointed out to Swann that Sydney had spent
$9333.48 on drawing and pumping water alone. A new engine
Published by eGrove, 2001

15

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 28 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 3
46

Accounting Historians Journal, December 2001

costing $8651.68 would save $1726.20 per annum in working
and $700 on repairs [PANS: MG1/159/59]. Brown, Sr. sent an
estimate to Foord in May 1860 of the cost of opening pits at
Cornhill, along with the cost of a branch railroad [PANS: MG1/
159/17b]. There was a reasonable amount of detail about the
various cost items associated with these projects, but his estimates still fell short of the capital improvement estimates made
on Tyneside a generation earlier. Brown sent the GMA’s Board
of Directors an estimate for a new colliery at Low Point in the
early 1870s, totaling £27259 [PANS: MG1/159/54a, b]. Items
that would have been broken down in Newcastle included
“materials of all kinds in pit £3140” and “labor £1370.” Contingencies were given at 20%, twice the “fudge factor” typical of
Tyneside costings of capital projects.
If focusing on expense control was possibly a function of
absentee ownership, is there an explanation as to why accounting for capital improvements, particularly in transportation,
was in a nascent state of development compared to practice in
the vicinity of Newcastle? 5 It is difficult to tell as the mines in
Nova Scotia appear to have had access to the same range of
technical and accounting expertise as in Tyneside, although the
relative concentration of expertise in England compared to
Canada was probably a factor. Resident viewers, often trained
in England, such as Brown, Sr., Scott, or Hudson were in place
in the mines at Albion and Sydney, while general viewers from
England acted as consultants. This was the pattern employed at
the Earl of Lowther’s estates in England from whence Brown,
Sr. came, although in other situations, such as the Londonderry
estates in County Durham, general viewers such as Buddle were
in residence or acted as partners in mining enterprises. The
greater depth of the Tyneside coal mines, at least until 1854
when the Queen Pit was opened at Sydney, and the more substantial distances of access to water transport may have occasioned a greater attention to capital expenditure projects. Also,
the Newcastle-area viewers, who performed a variety of cost
accounting functions, may have been more interested in “bigger-picture” items than daily expense control. Absentee ownership might have influenced differential agency patterns and the
nature of the accounting data required. Another possibility is

5
See Fleischman and Parker [1997, pp. 121, 125, 131] for a discussion of
appraising the relative advantages of capital improvement projects and estimating the profitability of new workings on Tyneside.
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the difference in competitive environments prior to 1858 when
the GMA’s monopoly ceased. In Britain, coal mining was
extremely competitive throughout the 19th century, and technology provided the key to accessing more coal at greater
depths at lesser cost, as well as reducing the cost of transportation. In Nova Scotia, the GMA’s position was not seriously
challenged until the second half of the century when its relative
fortunes declined. Falling profit margins as a consequence of
increased competition have been traditionally portrayed in the
literature as an impetus to better costing systems [Solomons,
1952, p. 19].
Regulation: Another feature of Nova Scotian coal mining was
the large amount of internal management data required by the
provincial government. As lessor of the province’s mineral
rights (in the U.K. the mineral rights belonged to the landowner), the provincial government had an interest in the mines
being managed efficiently to maximize its royalties and to preserve the mines’ future operating capability. While it is assumed
that British landowners were profit maximizers in terms of
royalties from their coal leases, they could not command the
volume of information solicited by the government.6 For this
reason, the GMA was obliged to submit an annual survey of the
state of the operations, and the government’s Inspector of
Mines had full access to the mine workings [PANS: RG1/461/
123]. For instance, surveys have survived for the Joggins and
Albion Mines in 1859 that give details of location, seams,
method of access, shafts, depth, levels from the shafts, drifts,
overground railways, winding gear, wharves, buildings, and
steam engines [PANS: RG1/461/106, 198]. Analyses of sales and
employees were also required on an annual basis. In 1846, for
example, returns were prepared of the quantity and value of
coal raised and sold during the year from the Albion, Sydney,
and Bridgeport Mines, sub-analyzed by market (U.S., neighboring colonies, and home consumption) and by size of coals
[PANS: RG1/461/3-4]. There are many similar examples covering a wide range of years. The analysis by markets shows that

6

We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for AHJ who informed us that
the British government began to require data from collieries regarding employment and output, commencing in 1872. Apparently the amount of information
solicited increased over time. In the case of Nova Scotia, there was a quantum
leap in the required data between the 1840s and the 1870s, but returns for the
1880s and 1890s have not survived in the archives.
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the purpose of this information went beyond the calculation of
royalties (royalties were based on total output). The survival of
various time series, such as a statement of coal shipped to the
U.S. in the years 1830, 1840, 1850, and 1855, suggests that the
main interest of the government in these returns was to monitor the industry’s development [PANS: RG1/461/121]. The government also seems to have had a demographic interest in the
industry, hence the requirement for the GMA to submit annual
returns of the average numbers of persons employed at each
mine during the two preceding years [PANS: RG1/461/123].
These returns listed the average numbers of men and boys by
occupation and, like the surveys and sales returns, were sworn
by two company officials before a justice of the peace [PANS:
RG1/461/110].
On Tyneside as well, there was an institution exogenous to
the individual coal-mining enterprises which dictated the generation of additional accounting data than would otherwise be
required. There the relevant agencies were the coal-owners’
cartels that collected large quantities of information for the
purpose of controlling both the retail sales and labor markets
[see Fleischman and Macve (2001) and Oldroyd (1996)].
Accounting for Labor: It seems clear that labor scarcity was a
reality of Cape Breton mining as was the case in the Newcastle
vicinity [Fleischman and Macve, 2001]. The problem was specifically mentioned in the reports to the proprietors’ yearly
meetings in 1871, 1873, 1883, and 1887 [BI: MG1419/91-682690/G2, 4, 14, 17] and was discussed in the GMA’s abstracts of
accounts for 1873 and 1874 [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/H, 1873,
1874]. Occasionally reasons for the perceived shortfall were
provided. In 1871, workers were siphoned off to work on the
Intercolonial Railway [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G2]. Rutherford
reported in 1873 that a shortage of worker housing was a problem [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/H, 1873]. Strikes could also spawn
temporary dislocations, as at Lingan in 1883 [BI: MG1419/9168-2690/G 14]. Of course, one does not need to look very far for
root-cause explanations given the smallness of population relative to the scale of coal-mining operations. Attempts to remedy
the situation through the importation of workers proved abortive. The provincial government imported French emigrants in
1873 [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G, 1874]. Brown, Sr. wrote to his
son in May 1882 of the “disgraceful conduct” of the scoundrels
imported from Scotland to work in the mines [PANS: MG1/151/
446]. The problem of labor shortage was exacerbated by the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/3
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extreme mobility of the mining population, who proved willing
to move from coalfield to coalfield, often on a collective basis
[McKay, 1983, pp. 306, 311, 323].
McKay [1983, pp. 311-320] did not find as serious a labor
shortage in the Cumberland Coalfields further south in Nova
Scotia. In point of fact, the local population was sufficient to
obviate the need to import foreign-born labor. McKay also
found that the “extraordinary mobility of the mining population” meant that Cape Breton miners could be attracted to the
region, particularly to the major mining operation of Springhill.
The movement does not appear to have been a two-way flow,
however, as Cape Breton was a far more distant outpost with
few alternative employment opportunities. Here, where the importation of British miners was a higher priority, the comparatively lower wages failed to attract many recruits.
Perhaps as serious a problem as the shortage of miners was
their perceived low level of productivity. Rutherford complained in 1873 that the number of workers was adequate but
that the recent increase in wages had “induced less work from
each individual” [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G4]. Rutherford reported to the GMA’s proprietors in 1874 that a vicious cycle
involving wage levels and production characterized Nova
Scotian mining. The miners took advantage of their scarcity
and market conditions to secure wage increases. “The usual
result of these advances was to be feared, viz., a diminished
production arising from mere idleness in many cases, and from
a reduction in the amount of work performed by the more
industrious workmen” [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/H, 1874].
Swann’s visitations in the early 1880s brought a similar lament.
He complained about the indolence of the men, rather than the
paucity of numbers, as responsible for production shortfalls.
His expectation was for 80-100 tons per man per month, but
the actual results were 50-60 [BI: MG1419/91-68-2690/G 12].
The senior Brown was very conscious of the expense to the
company of sub par work. He wrote in his book [Brown, 1871,
p. 70; see also Martell, 1945, p. 170] that the company had to
provide the same rations (and housing) for all workers, regardless of their skill levels.
The Sydney managers did not adopt methods used in the
U.K. to guarantee an adequate supply of labor. In the Newcastle
area, miners were bound to a specific colliery for a period typically just short of a year. The system was made functional by
the mine-owners’ cartel that limited to some degree the mobility of miners to seek out better conditions or wages within the
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region. Martell [1970, p.170] found evidence that a form of
binding existed in the early days of Nova Scotia coal mining.
Supposedly miners could be engaged on either four or twelvemonth contracts, commencing January 1. In either scenario,
the miners were paid only at the contract’s termination date.
However, there is no indication that the GMA mines entered
into contractual agreements of this type, and there was certainly no owners’ association in Nova Scotia to clip the colliers’
wings. In any event, “binding” had mostly disappeared from
Tyneside by the middle of the century, to be replaced by
monthly or fortnightly contacts [Church, 1986, pp. 237, 261;
Fleischman and Macve, 2001; Hammond and Hammond, 1919,
p. 12].
Other U.K. coal regions attempted to use subcontracting
(the “butty” or “chartermaster” system) to retain a labor force.
The Sydney archive contains both a proposal and an actual
subcontracting agreement. In his 1842 report on the unprofitability of Albion, Wightman suggested subcontracting the labor
function in order to pass the risk of inefficiency to the subcontractor [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 3]. There is no evidence that the
Board seriously considered establishing that form of labor control, although there does exist an 1869 subcontracting agreement with Richard Partridge, a molder (patternmaker). The
contractor agreed to specified piece rates and to pay rents, doctor fees and coal for his charges [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 3]. However, since the molding function was such a small part of the
Sydney operations, it cannot be assumed that this method was
of importance.
The labor control technique that found favor with Sydney’s
management was a series of piece-rate structures with varying
degrees of sophistication.7 The accounting records that tracked
labor varied considerably during the course of the 19th century.
The earliest was a “GMA Timebook” dated 1830-1832 [BI:
MG1419/83-110-1870/E1a]. The miners were numbered with
comments offered for those who did not put in a full-day’s work
(such as, absences, injuries and sicknesses). The entries rarely
dealt with workers’ inefficiencies, except when their physical
presence differed from expectation. There was one mention of

7
It is well known in the economic literature that increasing piece rates as a
device to attract labor is dysfunctional since the higher wages result in heightened voluntary absenteeism [Hirsh and Hausman, 1983, p. 147; Walters, 1975,
p. 293].
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an operative being fined for failing to separate slack from large
coals and another who turned in a cart under measure. As time
went on, the number of comments increased and came to include the home-coal consumption of individual miners. In
March 1832, for example, items were recorded on 40 of the 140
operatives. The data collection improved with the July 1832
entry as monthly recapitulations appeared in the book wherein
each man’s productivity was totaled and reconciled to the production total from each pit. The prices for getting the coals
were also stipulated as were the piece rates paid for carting coal
to the wharf. These rates varied from 5d to 2s per 36-bushel
chaldron as a function of pit location. In 1872, Brown, Sr.
wrote to his son suggesting a premium plan whereby a 10%
bonus would be paid to workers who averaged five days per
week at work for the year [PANS: MG1/151/164]. While there is
no indication whether this plan was ever implemented, it and
other surviving evidence lead us to believe that Sydney management and the GMA were primarily concerned with labor turnout. Labor efficiency was an imponderable that a manipulation
of piece rates failed to solve as was also the case on Tyneside
and elsewhere in the U.K. [Fleischman and Macve, 2001]. This
approach seems to be characteristic of environments where
labor is scarce and cannot be recruited from other industries
[see, for example, Fleischman and Tyson’s (2000) study of accounting on Hawaiian sugar plantations].
This apparent concern for turning out as opposed to productivity was reflected in a lengthy series of time books, 18391879 [BI: MG1419/81-52-1272/A1-A10]. Throughout the length
of the series, the only information conveyed were tick marks
representing days worked by individual miners. Occasionally
quarter days of work were indicated. The books contained columns for pay rates that were rarely filled. The only exception
was the 1858-1859 time book [BI: MG1419/81-52-1272/A7]
which contained details on individual hewers’ productivity in
terms of tubs mined, forward progress, and mine location.
Whatever happened at Sydney at the time of this record-keeping discontinuity also occurred at the smaller Point Aconi Mine,
another GMA holding [BI: MG1419/83-110-1870/A22]. Here, for
example, Daniel Hartigan received £9.15s in September 1855
for 91⁄2 days sinking at 6s, “15 yards of level at 4s” (presumably
a reference to forward progress), and 105 tubs at 9d.
The lack of piece-rate information between 1839-1879 is
surprising given that we know from other sources that the company was using piece-rate incentives in 1834 and 1878, that
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piece rates were used at the Spanish River Mines in Sydney as
early as 1801 [PANS: RG21/A], and that the piece-rate system
was the established method of paying miners in Britain
throughout the 19th century. In 1834, Buddle said that he was
very concerned about the high proportion of small coals being
produced at Sydney and made the following recommendation:
The present mode of paying the Colliers by cubical
measure, is I conceive objectionable in every point of
view, as it holds no inducement whatever to them, to
take any pains in producing round Coals, as far as I
can discover. And I should strongly recommend working by the Ton to be adopted, to separate or riddle the
Coal below ground, and to pay the Collier for the
round Coals only - or at any rate to pay a very reduced
price for the small. By this plan it would become the
Collier’s interest to make all the round Coal he possibly
could, and it would also enable the proprietors to reward him, for doing so, by giving him an additional
price, on the round [NRO: 3410/BUD19/279].
This quote illustrates a system of piece rates already in operation, as well as showing a belief in their potential for influencing behavior so as to optimize the firm’s profitability. Similarly,
in 1878, the “Billy Fairplay” system was introduced at Sydney,
having first been developed in South Wales and from thence
making its way to the North of England [BI: MG1419/91-682690/H, 1879 report to the GMA]. The system was a screening
process that separated small coals and stones from the more
valuable larger chunks. Because the screening was done on the
surface, the miners underground were spared the labor of “riddling,” the process of separating the two coal varieties. Brown,
Sr. initially informed his son of “Billy Fairplay” in April 1877
[PANS: MG1/151/285]. A year later, in a letter to H. Poole,
Brown, Jr. reported the establishment of the system from April
1, 1878 [PANS: RG21/A/3]. Not only did the process produce a
higher quality product for sale because the slack was now fully
screened out, but it provided an inducement through a revised
piece-rate structure for the miners to be more cautious in
avoiding the smaller coals. Previously, miners had been paid
$0.39 per ton of large coal and $0.17 for riddled slack. Now the
piece rate was $0.43 per ton for large coals and nothing for
slack. Brown observed to Poole that the miners could typically
make the same or slightly more money and produce more coal
per day, saved as they were the labor of riddling. The fact
remains, however, that complaints about productivity were a
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss2/3
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recurrent theme, suggesting that while it is likely that piece
rates were used throughout the period, they did not achieve the
desired result, which could explain the emphasis on turnout in
the pay records.
Commencing in the 1880s, the time books became vastly
more complicated and reflected a wage structure that may have
existed earlier, but which is not contained in extant Sydney
records we have seen. A number of piece rates were inscribed
into the front covers of the volumes. The rates paid in 18821883 for the quantity of tons mined varied from $0.44 to $0.62
as a function of the “height” of the seams from which the coal
was taken. “Height” referred to the thickness of a coal seam so
that a thicker seam would yield a greater quantity of coal more
readily. Consequently, coal mined from a seam of four feet,
eight inches in height was priced at $0.44, while a ton from a
three-foot seam returned $0.62.8 Likewise, piece rates were also
paid for forward progress, varying from $0.50 to $0.86 for
workings ranging from six to nine yards wide. Day rates were
also given — $1.07 for cutters, $0.80 for driving. Prices were
also provided for slack coal and stones of various diameters. A
few other points of interest were apparent in the 1882-1883
rates. Prices paid in winter were only 75% of those paid in
summer.9 The transition from long tons to tons occurred at this
time, and piece rates are provided for each. Finally, the U.K.
term “hewer” for the miner taking coal from the coalface had
been replaced by “coal cutter” [BI: MG1419/81-52-1272/A10].
The contents of these volumes featured the calculations of
pay for the cutters, combining the various components. There
were data categories for each individual cutter of days worked
cutting at the day rate, the forward progress at four prevailing
rates, the tonnage prices, as well as columns for fines and remarks. In subsequent books of this genre, there were additional
data categories for non-routine cutter functions, such as “room
breaking,” “troubles,” “timbering,” and “low coal” (with
8

We are grateful to Trevor Boyns for correcting our error in previous
drafts that “height” referred to vertical distance from the mine floor so that
higher piece rates were paid for coal closer to the floor which would have
required the miner to stoop in order to access the coal.
9
Nothing we have seen in the archive explains this seasonal differential. It
may have reflected the additional cost of banking and tied-up capital since
Sydney’s harbor was frozen until the spring thaw. The lower piece rate may
have represented the minimum the GMA felt it had to pay during the slack
season to retain its labor force. This situation was in evidence on Tyneside at
least for the hewers. Here, however, the slack season was considerable shorter.
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subheaders of height, tons, and piece rate) [BI: MG1419/81-521272/A11]. It would appear that the Sydney management had
developed a pay structure that took into account the wide variety of work environments which the cutter could encounter.
Later time books of the 1880s saw additional refinements.
First, a distinction was made in the piece rates paid at two pits
designated north and south. Second, the piece rates were
amended annually, an attention not in evidence on Tyneside
during the industrial revolution. Finally, the records came to
include columns headed “cavil” and “tally.” “Tally” was a general term that did not have a specific application in coal-mining
terminology in the 19th century, and could signify any kind of
matching up. McKay [1983, p. 864] defined it as the number
placed by the miner on the tubs of coal filled. The fact that each
miner had a distinct tally number, with his “previous tally” also
recorded, meant that pay was cross-referenced to output on an
ongoing basis. Positioning was a significant factor in earnings
potential, and “caviling” enabled the cutters to share good and
inferior places by drawing lots. Similar equity considerations
were seen in Tyneside mining [Church, 1986, p. 275; Flinn and
Stoker, 1984]. The “cavil” column reflected a sequential numbering of the miners in pairs, perhaps indicating the operation
of a “buddy” system. Such mutual looking-after was much more
vital in a “bord and pillar” environment where the cutters were
more isolated in the mine.
Aside from the later time books, there is little surviving
evidence that the GMA used the accounting books to control
labor productivity.10 There are two coal account books for
Sydney 1889-1890 [BI: MG1419/82-256-1726/D3a, b] and for
Victoria Mines 1884-1885 [D3c]. These volumes recorded the
individual miner’s daily production of riddled coal and slack (in
separate books for Sydney). There is also an extant hauling
account book dated 1893-1896, which contains the tonnage
hauled by each operative daily multiplied by the piece rate as
10

Christopher Napier, the discussant of this paper at the IPA Conference,
Manchester, July 2000, queried why would economically rational managers
carry on for a half-century with a system that did not achieve the desired labor
control. While we feel comfortable with the explanation that a new control
system would be too costly, particularly with reference to anticipated resistance from a scarce labor force, there is a possibility that the apparently
heightened attention to piece rates in the 1880s might have been in place all
along and that the evidence just did not survive in the archive. After all, there
were scattered time books from the 1850s that reflected the same intricate
piece-rate calculation methodology.
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determined by the distance involved. Also noted was the number of days each worked, although never expressed in half or
quarter days as seen in the miners’ time books [BI: MG1419/8152-1272/A17]. In none of these volumes is there any indication
that punitive action was taken against inefficient or unproductive workers, suggesting that their purpose was to reconcile
payments to output rather than to increase efficiency. According to McKay [1983, p. 848], the lack of discipline of the work
force was a distinctive feature of coal-mining culture in Nova
Scotia.
It may have been that the GMA would have generated even
less information on its laboring force were it not for the wealth
of data required by Nova Scotia’s provincial government
through its Inspector of Mines. The paper has already touched
on the provision of costing data for regulation. The government
had to be in a position to respond to memorials such as the one
presented in 1873 by the leading mine owners soliciting the
revocation of royalties during hard times [PANS: RG21/A/Vol.
12]. A printed form was distributed to the mines in 1875, requesting a vast amount of information. 21 operative groups
were identified, and for each, highest, lowest, and average wage
data were required for 1873 and the average for “10 or 20 years
ago.” Additionally, prices of necessities were requested, along
with data on housing availability and cost. These costs were
totaled to calculate average cost per man per day. Further categories asked the cost and consumption of oil, powder, picks,
and other mining materials. Finally, in questions which paralleled those asked by the Newcastle coal-owners’ cartel in the
1830s, the greatest amounts of coal mined and shipped on a
single day were solicited [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 12; see also
Fleischman and Macve, 2001]. In an interesting addendum, the
government invited the owners to indicate with an asterisk any
information they did not want made public.
AN IMPERIAL CONNECTION?
Having examined the accounting methods in evidence at
the Sydney Mines, we will attempt in this section to measure
Nova Scotia’s inheritance from Tyneside specifically and the
U.K. more generally. Given the GMA’s absentee ownership, a
researcher might expect a substantial flow of information to
London and back as was found in various archives of participants in the industrial revolution such as Carron [Fleischman
and Parker, 1990] and Cyfarthfa [Edwards, 1989]. However,
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there are few surviving financial reports which were going to,
or instructions coming from, the Board of Directors prior to the
1860s, and even subsequently most of the annual reports were
short and uninformative. The London proprietors were concerned with controlling expenses, but this attention was more
general than reflective of a careful item-by-item analysis. The
more significant links to Tyneside and Britain were in terms of
managerial accounting techniques and technological innovation. In particular, the expertise of the Newcastle viewer was a
vital resource for the Browns in their management of Sydney.
It is difficult to assess what Richard Brown brought with
him from the Earl of Lowther’s estates in England because of
the paucity of costing data that have survived in the estate
records. However, what does survive reveals consistency with
contemporary Newcastle practice. For example, annual unit
cost was calculated during the 31 years prior to 1842, and planning schedules exist of the extra costs that would have been
needed to increase weekly production [CRO: D/LONS/W7/1/28,
333A]. Brown does not feature in the estate papers despite his
notability in Canada. John Peile, the chief colliery agent, was
the main character, although they were both probably part of
the same viewing network. In 1838, John Buddle reminded
Brown of the method that had been employed by Peile to extinguish a fire in the estate mines in reply to a request for advice
on a similar fire at Pictou [PANS: MG1/158/3]. Buddle’s connection with the estates as a consultant went back at least as far as
1812 when he supplied answers to a number of Peile’s technical
queries [CRO: D/LONS/W7/1/28]. It is likely that he and Brown
were personally acquainted, which would help to explain why
the GMA used him subsequently. The same may have been true
of T.E. Forster. He was at his most active with the GMA in the
1860s; the second earliest extant profit and loss statement for
1869 reveals a stipend paid to him of £105 [BI: MG1419/91-682690/H, 1870], but a document in the Nova Scotia archives
shows that he and Brown had an earlier connection. In May
1839, Forster, “as requested by Mr Brown,” reported to the
Directors of the Northern Coal Company that had been formed
two years previously in England [Church, 1986, p. 131] on the
value of the collieries leased to them [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 7].
Such connections are not surprising given the way viewers
trained and operated. Top viewers like Buddle and Forster sold
their consulting services nationally and internationally and
were extremely influential. Church [1986, p. 410] referred to the
importance of their patronage in securing positions at the
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largest collieries, as was the case at the Albion Mines in April
1865 following the death of James Scott, the resident manager.
Forster regretted Scott’s death in a letter to Charles Tupper, the
Provincial Secretary, and mentioned that it was he who had
originally sent Scott out 11 years before [PANS: RG21A/5].
Forster’s nephew, James Hudson, proved to be the replacement.
Tupper had been asking for Forster’s help in finding a new
Inspector of Mines, and Forster replied that he could recommend someone, although the going rate for “a good and practical viewer” was £600 per annum plus expenses.
While the mines in Nova Scotia had “managers” who performed many of the same functions as the resident “viewers” on
Tyneside, the GMA also drew upon the expertise of nonresident
“general viewers” from the north-east on a wide range of issues.
As well as providing consulting services, Buddle apparently did
procurement for the Sydney Mines. In a letter to Brown, Sr., he
averred that he had not yet made a contract for iron coal tubs
but would work with Mr. Foord of the GMA on the matter.
Forster, for his part, drafted a list of questions to put to Brown,
Jr. in the late 1860s to serve as the basis for suggesting operational changes [PANS: MG1/151/52b]. Unfortunately, neither
the questions nor the answers have survived in the archive.
Apparently, Forster procured technology for the mines as had
Buddle. A letter from Brown, Sr. on March 30, 1867 informed
Brown, Jr. that Forster would solicit tender offers on a new
engine once provided with information on the depth of shafts,
the size of pumps, and the tons of coal to be raised [PANS:
MG1/151/16]. In 1877 Forster reported to the GMA on underground haulage techniques [PANS: MG1/151/285].
Swann, the long-term Secretary of the GMA, visited mines
in Wales and Staffordshire in 1880 to study underground haulage [PANS: MG1/151/389]. Earlier, Swann had observed and
detailed the screening process used in the Newcastle vicinity
[PANS: MG1/151/268]. These studies were but two of many
technological investigations undertaken by GMA personnel.
Brown, Jr. toured the Seaton Delaval Colliery in FebruaryMarch, 1864. He filled an 80-page notebook with his observations on this major Tyneside coaling operation [PANS: MG1/
152/74]. His major interest was in technology as typified by a
coal-hewing machine he described to Foord in a letter dated
February 23, 1864 [PANS: MGI/159/10a,b]. Although the machine was applicable only to the “longwall” method of mining
rather than the “bord and pillar” technique typical of Nova
Scotia and Tyneside, Brown wrote a very detailed narrative of
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operations, including the descriptions and pay rates of the 16
operatives required per shift. The total cost per shift was
£3.7s.2d with typical production of 90 tubs of 8 cwt. each, depending upon seam thickness. Brown was also interested in the
British names given to various operative classifications and to
U.K. ventilation methods. He also took notes on testimony
given by T.E. and G.B. Forster before a Parliamentary investigating committee. In particular, Brown wanted to get expert opinion on how much coal to extract (1/3) and how much
to leave in the pillars of the mine (2/3) to provide adequate
shoring for the roof using the extraction technique employed in
Nova Scotia [PANS: MG1/152/74].
Personnel were sent from Canada to Newcastle for training.
The best viewers had their own firms of associates and apprentices, as is revealed by correspondence in 1872 between James
Hudson and G.B. Forster. Hudson had inquired whether
Forster was prepared to accept the nephew of Mr. Cunard, the
GMA’s agent in Halifax, as a trainee, and Forster wrote back in
the affirmative, setting out his terms. He revealed that he currently had six apprentices, although he personally was not involved in their early training as they were too much of “a bother
at first” [NRO: 3410/FOR/2/16/136]. Three generations of
Richard Browns were committed to the lessons that could be
learned from U.K. mining. In September 1870, the senior
Brown, now in semi-retirement in the U.K., advised his son that
managers in Nova Scotia should travel to England to visit the
northern collieries “to get any information or knowledge of
improvement” [PANS: MG1/151/107]. A quarter of a century
later, Brown, Jr. proposed to the GMA that he send his son to
England “to get familiar with the most modern mining practices,” particularly those with undersea operations [PANS:
MG1/152/255]. However, it was recognized that on occasion the
parroting of British methods could produce costly results because of environmental differences. For example, the report of
George Wightman for 1842, which identified the causes of
losses incurred at the Albion Mines, observed that the miners
were overpaid since a sufficient number of miners had to be
retained for periods of maximum production, and the wages
paid had to cover the lengthy slack period of winter (frequently
four months). The precedent for this practice was related “to
the maxims and practices of England,” but there the slack season was considerably shorter, typically a month around Christmas in Tyneside [PANS: RG21/A/Vol. 3, folder of materials,
1841-1856].
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CONCLUSION
The paper has compared the costing methods employed by
the GMA in Nova Scotia to practice in the U.K. in the 19th
century, especially to the North-East of England. Costing was
used by the GMA for expense control, including labor, and to
generate data for the regulatory authorities. In the area of dayto-day expense control, the GMA mine managers seem to have
taken great care, as did their counterparts in Newcastle. In
Nova Scotia the system went beyond the tracking of expenditure and constituted a genuine system of cost control. Expenses
were analyzed monthly and yearly and subjected to ex post
rationalization. There are indications that this heightened emphasis on expense control reflected difficulties felt by the Directors in London in managing the operations at such a distance.
It might also be the case that greater attention to actual costs,
as distinct from ex ante cost estimation techniques for business
decision making, may typify more nascent cost accounting
frontiers. In terms of the major items of capital expenditure,
the GMA’s costings do not compare favorably with the careful
estimations and cost tracking of pit sinkings, rail and wagonway construction, and new technology procurement in NorthEast England. This deficiency was probably related to the concentration of technical and accounting expertise in Tyneside
compared to Canada. The difference in competitive environments was another factor.
Common links with Tyneside in the personnel and in the
costing procedures adopted show that some costing methods
were exported from Britain to Canada. Tyneside viewers were
highly influential. Resident managers at Albion and Sydney
were drawn from their ranks, and the best viewers also provided consultancy, recruitment, and procurement services. Personnel were sent from Canada to Britain for training.
These findings support a global view of the development of
management accounting in different locales at the expense of
cultural differences. However, the paper has only considered
the costing records of the GMA, an English company. Perhaps
it is not surprising that it relied heavily on English practice.
Although the GMA was the single most important company in
the development of coal mining in Nova Scotia in the 19th
century, it became but one of several mining companies after
1858, with capital coming from the U.S. and Montreal as well
as the U.K. The province therefore stood at a cultural crossroads between investors from the south, west, and east, and it
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would be worthwhile replicating this study in relation to the
new investment taking place in the second half of the century.
Similarly, there are the coalfields of Pennsylvania and Virginia
to consider which were the GMA’s major competitors in the
U.S. market. Harris [1976] referred to a number of studies on
the transfer of coal-mining technology from Britain to the U.S.,
and it would be interesting to see whether costing practice was
homogenized here also, or whether these fields developed their
own distinct tradition.
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